Software Model Checking and Counter-example Guided Abstraction Refinement

17-355/17-655/17-819: Program Analysis

Rohan Padhye and Jonathan Aldrich

April 29, 2021

Slides developed with Claire Le Goues

institute for SOFTWARE RESEARCH

Carnegie Mellon University School of Computer Science

Motivation: How should we analyze this?

```
2: do {
    lock();
    old = new;
3: if (*){
4: unlock();
    new++;
    }
5: } while (new != old);
6: unlock();
    return;
```

- * means something we can't analyze (user input, random value)
- Line 5: the lock is held if and only if old = new

Motivation: How should we analyze this?

Example()	{
1: $if(*)$	
7: do {	
	<pre>got_lock = 0;</pre>
8:	if (*){
9:	<pre>lock();</pre>
	<pre>got_lock++;</pre>
	}
10:	if (got_lock){
11:	unlock();
	}
12: } wh:	iĺe (*)
}	

- * means something we can't analyze (user input, random value)
- Line 10: the lock is held if and only if got_lock = 1

Tradeoffs...

Exa	amp]	Le() {	{		
1:	if	(*){	-		2:
7:		do {			
			got	lock = 0;	
8:			if	(*){	3:
9:				<pre>lock();</pre>	4:
			_	<pre>got_lock++;</pre>	
			}		
10:			if	(got_lock){	5:
11:				unlock();	6:
			}		•••
12:		} whi	ile	(*)	
	}	-			


Symbolic execution shows need to eliminate infeasible paths, see lock/unlock on correlated branches (more complicated logic!). **Dataflow analysis** requires fixed abstractions, e.g., zero/non-zero, locked/unlocked

Explicit-state Model Checking needs programs to be represented as a finite state model...state explosion??

Enter: Abstraction Refinement

- Can we get both soundness and the precision to eliminate infeasible paths?
 - In general: of course not! That's undecidable.
 - But in many situations we can solve it with *abstraction refinement.*
- ...what will we lose?
 - $\circ~$ Answer: Termination guarantees. OH WELL.






CEGAR: Counterexample Guided Abstraction Refinement

Carnegie Mellon University School of Computer Science

institute for **SOFTWARE**

RESEARCH

Property: Locking Protocol




"An attempt to re-acquire an acquired lock or release a released lock will cause a deadlock."

Calls to lock and unlock must alternate.

Carnegie Mellon University School of Computer Science

Example Blast Input

```
Example ( ) {
1: do {
      lock();
       old = new;
      q = q - next;
   if (q != NULL) \{
2:
3:
       q->data = new;
          unlock();
          new ++;
4: } while (new != old);
5:
   unlock ();
    return;
  SOFTWARE
          School of Computer Science
```





Incorporating Specs

```
Example () {
1: do {
      lock();
      old = new;
     q = q - next;
2: if (q != NULL) {
3: q->data = new;
       unlock();
       new ++;
4: } while (new != old);
5: unlock ();
   return;
           lock
          unlock
 unlock
                    lock
```


```
Example () {
1: do{
      if L=1 goto ERR;
      else L=1;
      old = new;
      q = q - next;
2:
      if (q != NULL) {
3:
         q - data = new;
          if L=0 goto ERR;
          else L=0;
         new ++;
4: } while (new != old);
5: if L=0 goto ERR;
                  Original program
    else L=0;
                  violates spec iff
    return;
                   new program
ERR: abort() +
                   reaches ERR
```

Program As Labeled Transition System





The Safety Verification Problem




Is there a **path** from an **initial** to an **error** state ? **Problem: Infinite** state graph (old=1, old=2, old=...) **Solution : Set** of states ' logical **formula**

Representing [Sets of States] as *Formulas*


<pre>[F] states satisfying F {s s ⊨ F }</pre>	F Formula over prog. vars
$[F_1] \cap [F_2]$	$F_1 \wedge F_2$
[F ₁] ∪ [F ₂]	$F_1 \lor F_2$
[F]	F
$[F_1] \subseteq [F_2]$	$F_1 \Rightarrow F_2$
	i.e. $F_1 \wedge \neg F_2$ unsatisfiable

Idea 1: Predicate Abstraction




- Predicates on program state:
 lock (i.e., lock=true)
 old = new
- States satisfying same predicates are equivalent
 - Merged into one abstract state
- #abstract states is finite
 - Thus model-checking the abstraction will be feasible!

Abstract States and Transitions




Abstraction




(i.e., $A_1 \rightarrow A_2$ iff $\exists c_1 \in A_1$. $\exists c_2 \in A_2$. $c_1 \rightarrow c_2$)

15

Abstraction



Analyze Abstraction




Analyze finite graph

Over Approximate: Abstract. Safe \Rightarrow System Safe No false negatives

Problem

Spurious counterexamples


Idea 2: Counterex.-Guided Refinement



Solution

Use spurious **counterexamples** to **refine** abstraction!

Idea 2: Counterex.-Guided Refinement




Solution

Use spurious **counterexamples** to **refine** abstraction

- 1. Add predicates to distinguish states across cut
- 2. Build **refined** abstraction Imprecision due to **merge**

Iterative Abstraction-Refinement




[Kurshan et al 93] [Clarke et al 00] [Ball-Rajamani 01]


Solution

Use spurious **counterexamples** to **refine** abstraction

- 1. Add predicates to distinguish states across **cut**
- 2. Build **refined** abstraction -eliminates counterexample
- 3. Repeat search Until real counterexample or system proved safe

Problem: Abstraction is Expensive





Reachable


Problem


#abstract states = 2^{#predicates}
Exponential Thm. Prover queries

Observe

Fraction of state space reachable #Preds ~ 100's, #States ~ 2¹⁰⁰, #Reach ~ 1000's

Solution1: Only Abstract Reachable States





Safe


Problem

#abstract states = 2^{#predicates}
Exponential Thm. Prover queries

Solution

Build abstraction during search

Solution2: Don't Refine Error-Free Regions



Problem

#abstract states = 2^{#predicates}
Exponential Thm. Prover queries


Solution

Don't refine error-free regions

Build reachability tree.

- Generate Abstract Reachability Tree
 - $\,\circ\,$ Contains all reachable nodes
 - $\,\circ\,$ Annotates each node with state
 - Initially LOCK = 0 or LOCK = 1
 - Cross product of CFG nodes and data flow abstraction
- Algorithm: depth-first search
 - $\circ~$ Generate nodes one by one
 - $\circ~$ If you come to a node that's already in the tree, stop
 - This state has already been explored through a different control flow path
 - $\circ~$ If you come to an error node, stop

Less abstractly: first build a control-flow graph... then use it to build a *reachability tree*





Carnegie Mellon University School of Computer Science

Key Idea: Reachability Tree

Unroll Abstraction

- 1. Pick tree-node (=abs. state) (CFG node + abstractions like lock status)
- 2. Add children (=abs. successors)
- 3. On re-visiting abs. state, cut-off

Find min infeasible suffix

- Learn new predicates
- Rebuild subtree with new preds.


We repeat node 3 rather than looping back (but cut off there)

Carnegie Mellon University

School of Computer Science

ISC institute for SOFTWARE RESEARCH

Key Idea: Reachability Tree



Error Free

Unroll Abstraction

- 1. Pick tree-node (=abs. state) (CFG node + abstractions like lock status)
- 2. Add children (=abs. successors)
- 3. On re-visiting abs. state, cut-off


Find min infeasible suffix

- Learn new predicates
- Rebuild subtree with new preds.

ISI institute for SOFTWARE RESEARCH

Carnegie Mellon University School of Computer Science

Key Idea: Reachability Tree



Unroll Abstraction

- 1. Pick tree-node (=abs. state) (CFG node + abstractions like lock status)
- 2. Add children (=abs. successors)
- 3. On re-visiting abs. state, cut-off

Find min infeasible suffix


- Learn new predicates
- Rebuild subtree with new preds.

Error Free




S1: Only Abstract Reachable StatesS2: Don't refine error-free regions

Less abstractly: build reachability tree




ISC institute for SOFTWARE RESEARCH


Carnegie Mellon University School of Computer Science










Reachability Tree










Reachability Tree










Reachability Tree








Reachability Tree




Reachability Tree

Predicates: LOCK

.7



Reachability Tree






Is the Error Real?

- Use weakest preconditions to find out the weakest precondition that leads to the error
 - If the weakest precondition is false, there is no initial program condition that can lead to the error
 - $\,\circ\,$ Therefore the error is spurious
- Blast uses a variant of weakest preconditions
 - creates a new variable for each assignment before using weakest preconditions
 - $\circ~$ Instead of substituting on assignment, adds new constraint
 - $\circ~$ Helps isolate the reason for the spurious error more effectively

Is the Error Real?

- assume True;
- lock();
- old = new;
- assume True;
- unlock();
- new++;
- assume new==old
- error (lock==0)





Model Locking as Assignment

- assume True;
- lock = 1;
- old = new;
- assume True;
- lock = 0;
- new = new + 1;
- assume new==old
- error (lock==0)




Index the Variables

- assume True;
- lock1 = 1
- **old1** = new1;
- assume True;
- lock2 = 0
- new2 = new1 + 1
- assume new2==old1
- error (lock2==0)



Generate Weakest Preconditions

- assume True;
- lock1 = 1
- **old1** = new1;
- assume True;
- lock2 = 0
- new2 = new1 + 1
- assume new2==old1
- error (lock2==0)





Carnegie Mellon University School of Computer Science

41

Relevant Sidebar: Craig Interpolation

- Given an unsatisfiable formula A ∧ B, the Craig Interpolant I is a formula such that:
 - $\circ \ \mathsf{A} \xrightarrow{} \mathsf{I}$
 - $\circ \quad I \wedge B \text{ is unsatisfiable}$
 - I only refers to variables mentioned in both A and B
- It is guaranteed to exist, proof elided.


- \wedge True
- ^ lock1==1
- \land old1==new1
- \wedge True
- ^ lock2==0
- ^ new2==new1+1
- \land new2==old1
- lock2==0

Why is the Error Spurious?

- More precisely, what predicate could we track that would eliminate the spurious error message?
- Consider, for each node, the constraints generated before that node (c1) and after that node (c2)
- Find a condition I such that
 - c1 => I
 - I is true at the node
 - I only contains variables mentioned in both c1 and c2
 - I mentions only variables in scope (not old or future copies)
 - $\circ \quad I \wedge c2 = false$
 - I is enough to show that the rest of the path is infeasible
 - I is guaranteed to exist
 - See Craig Interpolation

- \wedge True
- ^ lock1==1
- ^ old1==new1
 Interpolant:
 old == new
- \wedge True
- ^ lock2==0
- ^ new2==new1+1
- ^ new2==old1
- lock2==0


Analyze Counterexample



Reachability Tree

Predicates: LOCK

Analyze Counterexample




Predicates: LOCK

Reanalyzing the Program


- Explore a subtree again
 - \circ $\;$ Start where new predicates were discovered
 - \circ $\;$ This time, track the new predicates $\;$
 - If the conjunction of the predicates on a node is false, stop exploring—this node is unreachable



Reanalysis of Example (Left Side)




Analyzing the Right Hand Side



Exercise: run weakest preconditions from the unlock() at the end of the path 1-7-8-10-11-12.

Recall that we model locking with a variable *lock*, so unlock() is an error if *lock*==0



SOFTWARE RESEARCH

.ey: L = locked=1 Z = aot_lock=0

School of Computer Science

Generate Weakest Preconditions

- assume True;
- got_lock = 0;
- assume True;
- assume got_lock != 0;
- error (lock==0)





Why is the Error Spurious?

- More precisely, what predicate could we track that would eliminate the spurious error message?
- Consider, for each node, the constraints generated before that node (c1) and after that node (c2)
- Find a condition I such that
 - c1 => I
 - I is true at the node
 - I only contains variables mentioned in both c1 and c2
 - I mentions only variables in scope (not old or future copies)
 - $\circ \quad I \wedge c2 = false$
 - I is enough to show that the rest of the path is infeasible
 - I is guaranteed to exist
 - See Craig Interpolation

- \wedge True
- ^ got_lock==0
- \wedge True
- ^ got_lock!=0
- lock==0

Exercise: now find the Craig interpolant









...but only at the minimum suffix!

Reachability Tree


Predicates: *LOCK*, *new==old*



Predicates: LOCK, new==old




Predicates: *LOCK*, *new==old*



55

Key Idea: Reachability Tree



Unroll

- 1. Pick tree-node (=abs. state)
- 2. Add children (=abs. successors)
- 3. On re-visiting abs. state, cut-off

Find min spurious suffix

- Learn new predicates
- Rebuild subtree with new preds.


Error Free




S1: Only Abstract Reachable StatesS2: Don't refine error-free regions

Blast Techniques, Graphically

- Explores reachable state, not all paths
 - Stops when state already seen on another path



- Lazy Abstraction
 - $\circ~$ Uses predicates on demand
 - Only applies predicate to relevant part of tree



Program	Postprocessed	Pred	icates	BLAST Time	Ctrex analysis	Proof Size
	LOC	Total	Active	(sec)	(sec)	(bytes)
qpmouse.c	23539	2	2	0.50	0.00	175
ide.c	18131	5	5	4.59	0.01	253
aha152x.c	17736	2	2	20.93	0.00	
tlan.c	16506	5	4	428.63	403.33	405
cdaudio.c	17798	85	45	1398.62	540.96	156787
floppy.c	17386	62	37	2086.35	1565.34	
[fixed]		93	44	395.97	17.46	60129
kbfiltr.c	12131	54	40	64.16	5.89	
		48	35	256.92	165.25	
[fixed]		37	34	10.00	0.38	7619
mouclass.c	17372	57	46	54.46	3.34	
parport.c	61781	193	50	1980.09	519.69	102967

Experimental Results



School of Computer Science

Termination

- Not guaranteed
 - $\circ~$ The system could go on generating predicates forever
- Can guarantee termination
 - $\circ~$ Restrict the set of possible predicates to a finite subset
 - Finite height lattices in data flow analysis!
 - $\circ~$ Those predicates are enough to predict observable behavior of program
 - E.g. the ordering of lock and unlock statements
 - Predicates are restricted in practice
 - E.g. likely can't handle arbitrary quantification as in Dafny
 - Model checking is hard if properties depend on heap data, for example
 - $\circ~$ Can't prove arbitrary properties in this case
- In practice
 - Terminate abstraction refinement after a time bound



Key Points of CEGAR

- To prove a property, may need to strengthen it • Just like strengthening induction hypothesis
- CEGAR figures out strengthening automatically From analyzing why errors are spurious
- Blast uses *lazy abstraction*
 - Only uses an abstraction in the parts of the program where it is needed
 - $\,\circ\,\,$ Only builds the part of the abstract state that is reached
 - $\circ~$ Explored state space is *much* smaller than potential state space

Blast in Practice

- Has scaled past 100,000 lines of code
 - $\,\circ\,$ Realistically starts producing worse results after a few 10K lines
- Sound up to certain limitations
 - $\,\circ\,$ Assumes restricted ("safe") use of C
 - No aliases of different types; how realistic?
 - $\circ~$ No recursion, no function pointers
 - $\circ~$ Need models for library functions
- Has also been used to find memory safety errors, race conditions, generate test cases